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DENYING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: A BRIEF CRITIQUE 
OF TUNSTALL V. BERGESON 
Thomas A. Mayes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the State of Washington passed a statute that 
effectively limited public education in adult correctional 
facilities. 1 Under this statute, individuals under eighteen who 
are confined in Washington adult correctional facilities are still 
entitled to educational services. However, all other inmates, 
even those with disabilities, are no longer entitled to 
educational services.2 Following this statute's enactment, 
Washington State inmates filed a class action against the 
State, attacking the validity of the statute on multiple grounds. 
In the resulting case, Tunstall v. Bergeson,3 a divided 
Washington Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute 
on all contested grounds. 
The state Supreme Court's disposition of the case subjected 
it to varying degrees of criticism,4 the most substantial deriving 
from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Ace 
* Mr. Mayes (J.D., 1996, University of Iowa) practices law in Waterloo, Iowa. During 
the 1999-2000 academic year, Mr. Mayes was a graduate fellow in educational 
leadership at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He is also a member of the 
Iowa Commission of Persons with Disabilities. The views expressed herein are solely 
those of the author. 
1. 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 338, § 7, codified at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28A.193 (2002). 
2. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.193.005 (2002). 
3. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691 (Wash. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 
(2001). 
4. The other claims advanced by the class concerned the right to regular and 
special education under state statute, the right to regular and special education under 
the Washington constitution, and rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
(29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)). 
5. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400-87 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). 
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(hereinafter referred to as "the IDEA"). 6 Essentially, denying 
special education to incarcerated youth with disabilities, ages 
eighteen to twenty-one, runs contrary to the language and 
structure of the IDEA. 7 In light of the Tunstall decision, 8 this 
Article considers whether the Washington statute governing 
education in adult correctional facilities embodies sound law 
and good public policy. 9 After examining the IDEA and its' 
implementing regulations, it is apparent that the Washington 
statute is in conflict with the IDEA10 and is fundamentally 
misguided as a matter of public policy. 11 
II. BACKGROUND 
In March of 1998, the Washington legislature passed a 
statute that required the Washington State Department of 
Corrections to provide education to juveniles under eighteen, 
incarcerated in an adult facility. 12 The statute effectively 
6. See State Statute KOs Services to Incarcerated Students Ages 18-22, 16. The 
Spec. Educator (Aug. 29, 2001). 
7. See e.g. Loren Warboys et a!., California Juvenile Court Special Education 
Manual (1994); Peter E. Leone et a!., Understanding the Overrepresentation of Youths 
with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. Rev. 389 (1995); Kathleen Kelly, The 
Education Crisis for Children in the California Juvenile Court System, 27 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 757 (2000); Thomas A. Mayes, Persons with Autism and Criminal Justice: 
Core Concepts and Leading Cases, 5 J. Positive Behavior Interventions _ 
(forthcoming 2003); Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, The Intersections of Juvenile 
Law, Criminal Law, and Special Education Law, 4 U. Cal. Davis J. Juv. L. & Policy 
125 (2000); T. Rowand Robinson & Mary JaneK Rapport, Providing Special Education 
in the Juvenile Justice System, 20 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 19 (1999); Dominga Soliz & 
Noah Cutler, Student Authors, Disabled Youth, Incarceration, and Educational 
Challenges, 5 U. Cal. Davis J. Juv. L. & Policy 265 (2001). For an article suggesting 
that schools and the juvenile justice system "criminalize low student achievement," see 
Augustina H. Reyes, Alternative Education: The Criminalization of Student Behavior, 
29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 539, 555 (2001). 
8. See infra Part II discussing Tunstall. 
9. See infra Part III critiquing Tunstall. 
10. See infra Part III.C. A state law or policy may not conflict with the IDEA. 
See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special 
Education: Obligations and Liabilities, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 62, 80-82 (2000). 
11. See infra Part III.D.; see also Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All The 
Children Gone?: A Look At Incarcerated Youth In America, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
2435 (2001); Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime: Lessons Learned, 
Future of Children, Winter 1996, at 75; Kelly, supra n. 7; Jo Webber, Comprehending 
Youth Violence, 18 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 94 (1997). 
12. Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.193.030 (2002). The statute allows the state 
Superintendent of Public Instruction to adopt rules to allow eighteen-year-old students 
in adult prisons to continue participation in such educational programs. Wash. Rev. 
Code § 28A.193.030(4). As applied to children with disabilities, this particular 
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denied educational services to inmates who had passed their 
eighteenth birthday. Denying educational benefits to this 
latter age group is extremely worrisome because in April 1998, 
for example, roughly one thousand inmates in Washington's 
adult prison system were eighteen through twenty-one. 13 Of 
this age group, only one-fifth had earned a high school diploma 
or general equivalency diploma.14 A class of inmates aged 
eighteen to twenty-one brought an action shortly after the 
statute's passage. The trial court certified the following class: 
All individuals who are now, or will in the future be, 
committed to the custody of the Washington 
Department of Corrections, who are allegedly denied 
access to basic or special education during that custody, 
and who are, during that custody under the age of 21, or 
disabled and under the age of 22.15 
The case, Tunstall v. Bergeson, was tried on stipulated facts. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff class and 
partial summary judgment to the State. 16 The State appealed, 
and the plaintiff class cross appealed. On appeal and over ten 
months after oral argument, the Supreme Court of 
Washington, by a six-to-three vote, ruled in favor of the State 
on almost all grounds.17 On March 19, 2001, the United States 
Supreme Court denied the class's petition for a writ of 
certiorari.18 
provision runs afoul of federal law to the extent that federal law requires special 
education for all children with disabilities under age twenty-two. It purports to make 
optional what federal law would require. 
13. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 695. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 696; see Washington State Must Educate Juveniles in Adult Prisons, 
Court Rules, Correctional Educ. Bull. 2 (no. 2) (Nov. 1998). 
17. The Tunstall court reserved ruling on whether there was a constitutional 
right to special education for inmates between eighteen and twenty-two "until we have 
a case where the record and briefing are adequately developed." 5 P.3d at 695. 
The dissent based its rationale on grounds other than the IDEA; therefore, it will 
not be extensively discussed in this article. Id. at 710-13. 
18. 532 U.S. 920 (2001). A denial of a certiorari petition is not considered a 
decision on the merits of case, and has no precedential value. See e.g. Hopfmann u. 
Connolly, 471 U.S. 459, 461 (1985). 
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE TUNSTALL DECISION 
Although the Tunstall case concerned multiple issues, this 
critique will focus on the most disturbing facet of the court's 
decision: the court's termination of education to inmates with 
disabilities who are eighteen through twenty-one.19 As this 
portion of the ruling is a matter of statutory interpretation and 
construction, one must first examine the relevant terms of the 
IDEA to determine if Washington's statute is even 
. "bl 20 perm1ss1 e. 
A. The Core Terms of IDEA 
The core terms of the IDEA, both before and after the 1997 
IDEA amendments, are fairly straightforward. Each State 
receiving financial assistance under the IDEA is required to 
find and evaluate children with disabilities21 and provide those 
children with a "free appropriate public education" 
(hereinafter, "FAPE").22 Specifically, FAPE is specially 
designed instruction and necessary related services consistent 
with an Individualized Education Program (hereinafter IEP) 
provided in the least restrictive environment (hereinafter 
LRE).23 As a general rule under the IDEA, FAPE is to be 
provided to all children with disabilities who are ages three 
through twenty-one.24 Under certain circumstances, however, a 
State may decline to provide F APE to children with disabilities 
who are ages three through five and eighteen through twenty-
one "to the extent that [the IDEA's] application to those 
children would be inconsistent with State law or practice, or 
the order of any court, respecting the provision of public 
19. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28A.193 (2002). 
20. For more information concerning statutory construction, see Thomas A. Mayes 
& Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Special Education Students' Records: Do the 1999 
IDEA Regulations Mandate that Schools Comply with FERPA? 8 J.L. & Policy 455 
(2000). 
21. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (defining "child with a 
disability"). 
22. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (defining "free appropriate 
public education"). For the leading case on what constitutes FAPE, see Bd. of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). For information on the Rowley decision, see Perry A. 
Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education From Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing 
the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 Md. L. Rev. 466 (1983). 
23. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 10, at 63-66 (summarizing State obligations 
under the IDEA). 
24. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1) (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (2001). 
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education to children in one or more of those age groups."25 
The 1997 amendments26 to the IDEA made several 
pertinent changes concerning children with disabilities in adult 
correctional facilities. Initially, the amendments provided 
States with additional authority to limit the provision of FAPE 
to certain older children in adult prisons.27 Specifically, 20 
U.S.C. section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) allows states, by statute, to 
eliminate the right to F APE for children with disabilities, aged 
eighteen through twenty-one, who "in the last educational 
placement prior to their incarceration in an adult correctional 
facility [were not] actually identified as being a child with a 
disability [and] did not have an IEP."28 According to the 
legislative history, a child who was identified as a child with a 
disability who did not have an IEP in the most recent 
educational placement was not to be "excluded from services" 
under this provision. 29 In addition, an identified child with a 
disability who had an IEP in the last educational placement, 
before dropping out of school, remained entitled to FAPE.30 
Additionally, children with disabilities who are convicted as 
adults and incarcerated in adult prisons and who are entitled 
to F APE are subject to additional restrictions contained in Title 
20, United States Code, section 1414(d)(6).31 First, these 
children are not entitled to participate in state and district 
assessments.32 Second, transition planning for such a child is 
not required if that child's IDEA entitlement will end before 
the child's term of confinement will end.33 Finally, the 
student's IEP team may modify, on a "temporary" basis,34 the 
student's IEP or placement if the facility demonstrates "a bona 
fide security or compelling penological interest that cannot 
25. 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1) (2001); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
26. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). 
27. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). 
28. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122(a)(2), 300.311(a) (2001); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 
1412(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
29. H.R. Rep. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997). 
30. Id. 
31. See e.g. Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 607 (OSEP 1998); Letter to Galaza, 30 
IDELR 50 (OSEP 1997). 
32. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(A)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.311(b)(1) (2001). 
33. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(A)(ii) (2000); 34 C.F.R § 300.31l(b)(2) (2001). 
34. Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12, 
1999). 
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otherwise be accommodated."35 These three limitations do not 
apply to children in the juvenile system or to pretrial 
detainees.36 In contrast to the provisions of Title 20 of the 
United States Code, section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) discussed in 
previous paragraphs,37 which are limited to children who are 
eighteen to twenty-one, section 1414(d)(6) contains no lower 
age limit. The applicability of this provision depends on the 
age at which state law allows juveniles to be transferred to 
adult court. 38 
Finally, the 1997 IDEA amendments allow states to 
transfer the supervisory responsibility for providing FAPE to 
"children with disabilities who are convicted as adults and 
incarcerated in adult prisons" to another state agency, such as 
the department of corrections or the department of public 
safety.39 If that other state agency systematically violates the 
IDEA, "the United States Department of Education may only 
withhold a proportion of the state's IDEA funds equal to the 
proportion of children served by the other public agency, and 
any withholding may only effect the other public agency.':oo~o 
35. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(B) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 300.311(c) (2001). 
Administrative convenience or cost containment is not a sufficient interest under these 
provisions. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 138-39. Any programming or placement 
change under these provisions must be made by the IEP team, not the facility warden 
or chief corrections officer. See Perry Zirkel & Thomas Mayes, Are Inmates with 
Disabilities Entitled to Special Education?, The Spec. Educator 3 (Aug. 29, 2000) (The 
State has the burden of proving the necessity of the proposed changes.). 
36. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 139. 
37. See supra n. 27-30 and accompanying text. 
38. For information on transfer to adult court, see Kevin J. Strom, U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, Profile of State Prisoners under Age 18, 1985-97 (2000); Warboys, supra n. 7, at 
54-56; Conward, supra n. 11, at 2440-44; Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 79; Mayes & 
Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 132-33; Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional 
Facilities: Cultural Differences and the Right to Treatment, 16 L. & Ineq. J. 573, 575-76 
(1998). The number of youthful defendants transferred to adult court has increased 
dramatically in recent years. Strom, supra n. 37, at 3. Empirical research suggests 
that transfer to adult court "has little if any deterrent effect on criminal behavior." 
Janet E. Ainsworth, The Court's Effectiveness in Protecting the Rights of Juveniles in 
Delinquency Cases, Future of Children 64, 69 (Winter 1996). 
39. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(c) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (2001). This provision 
is primarily in response to California's objection to providing special education in adult 
prisons. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 151-52. A state must elect to transfer 
supervisory authority to the other state agency. Such a transfer does not occur 
automatically. To the extent that authorities imply that such a transfer occurs without 
affirmative action by the state, those authorities are inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 
1997 IDEA Amendments and Federal Regulations, 28 J.L. & Educ. 543, 556 (1999). 
40. Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 152 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1416(c) (2000); 34 
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Under this provision, inmates with disabilities confined to 
adult prisons affected by these sections remain entitled to 
FAPE41 and other enforcement mechanisms remain available.42 
B. The Tunstall Court Ruling 
The Tunstall court ruled against the inmates with 
disabilities on claims under both the pre-1997 IDEA and the 
post-1997 IDEA.43 The court claimed to ground its ruling on 
the pre-1997 claims on the Fourth Circuit's 1997 decision in 
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Education v. Riley.44 
The Riley court held that the IDEA did not require states to 
provide F APE to students expelled from school for conduct 
unrelated to their disability, as Congress did not explicitly 
condition receipt of IDEA funds on provision of F APE to 
expelled students.45 The Tunstall court analogized the 
termination of services to individuals with disabilities 
incarcerated in adult prisons and the expulsion of individuals 
with disabilities for conduct unrelated to their disability.46 
Regarding the post-1997 IDEA cases, the Tunstall court held, 
citing Title 20, United States Code, section 1412(a)(l)(B)(1), 
that providing FAPE to prison inmates with disabilities 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one would be 
"inconsistent with state law;"47 consequently, it was not 
required. 
C. The Tunstall Decision is Bad Law 
Having previously considered the relevant text of the IDEA 
in detail,48 one should consider whether the Tunstall decision 
can claim fidelity to the IDEA.49 To the extent that it does not 
C.F.R. § 300.587(e)(1999)). 
41. Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. at 12,644. 
42. Id. It is important to note that this section would not authorize the complete 
cessation of educational services to adult prison inmates with disabilities. Subject to 
the other limitations contained in IDEA '97, these inmates remain entitled to FAPE. 
However, the remedy for denial of FAPE would lie against the "other state agency," not 
the SEA. 
43. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 705-06. 
44. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997). 
45. Id. 
46. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 705-06. 
4 7. I d. at 706. 
48. See supra n. 19-42 and accompanying text. 
49. See generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and 
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conform to the boundaries of the text, it lacks legitimacy.50 In 
doing so, one may be aided by several well-settled rules of 
statutory construction, the most important of which is that a 
clear, unambiguous statute must be enforced as written by the 
legislature.51 To determine the clarity of a statute and, if 
ambiguous, the permissible constructions of the statute, one 
must read an enactment in its entirety.52 
1. The IDEA, as Amended 
Starting with the post-1997 IDEA, the law now in effect, it 
is clear that the State of Washington's decision to eliminate the 
provision of FAPE to many inmates with disabilities is not 
faithful to the terms of the IDEA Specifically, the 1997 
amendments allow state law to deny FAPE only to a narrowly 
defined subset of the inmate class-adult prisoners with 
disabilities, ages eighteen to twenty-one, who "in the last 
educational placement prior to their incarceration in an adult 
correctional facility [were not] actually identified as being a 
child with a disability [and] did not have an IEP."53 By limiting 
the breadth of this provision's reach only to a select portion of 
all inmates with disabilities, Congress clearly intended that the 
remaining inmates with disabilities retain a right to FAPE.54 
Further indication that the Tunstall class retained its right 
to F APE is found in the limitations that Congress allowed to be 
placed on the provision of F APE to children with disabilities 
confined to adult prisons after conviction as adults: limitations 
on participation in "high stakes" testing, elimination of the 
right to a transition plan in certain cases, and the ability to 
the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997); P.obert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the 
United States, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Summary 407-59 (D. Neil 
MacCormick & RobertS. Summers eds., Dartmouth Pub. Co. 1991). 
50. See e.g. U.S. Natl. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 
463 n.ll (1993). 
51. See e.g. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); Conn. Natl. Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); see also Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20, at 458-
59. 
52. King v. St. Vincent's Hasp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). 
53. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122(a)(2) (2001), 300.31l(a)(2) (2001); see 20 U.S.C.A. § 
1412(a)(l)(B)(ii) (2000). 
54. See e.g. Summers, supra n. 49, at 418. The particular rule of construction is 
often stated in Latin: "expressio unius exclusio alterius (mention of one excludes 
another)." Professor Summers states that this particular canon "seems to be taking on 
a new life." Id. (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1989)). 
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make short-term changes in a child's IEP or placement.55 The 
fact that only these three elements of FAPE were restricted is 
an unmistakable indication that the remaining rights under 
the IDEA were not eroded.56 As shown, the Washington state 
statute in question sweeps broader than permissible under the 
1997 IDEA amendments.57 
Instead of relying on section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) in its decision, 
the Tunstall court relied on section 1412(a)(1)(B)(i), which 
allows states to deny special education to children with 
disabilities between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one if 
providing special education to those children "would be 
inconsistent with state law or practice, or the order of any 
court ... "58 The Tunstall court's reliance on this section, as 
well as its implementing regulations, is misplaced because it 
refers to broad age groups. 59 As a general rule, it allows states 
to limit special education to whole "age ranges" rather than 
particular subsets of age groups. 60 Rephrased, an inconsistent 
state law or court order will trump the IDEA's presumptive 
entitlement for children with disabilities aged eighteen to 
twenty-one only if it applies to all children within that 
particular age range. 
For example, a state statute could permissibly forbid the 
provision of special education to all children with disabilities 
after their twentieth birthdays. By contrast, a state statute 
could not forbid the provision of special education in private 
residential facilities for children over eighteen. Hence, under 
55. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 300.31l(b) (2001). 
56. See e.g. Summers, supra n. 49, at 418. 
57. In defending its statute, the State of Washington also relied on 20 U.S. C. § 
1412(a)(l)(B)(ii). Notably, section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) would have only saved a portion of 
the Washington statute. See supra n. 27-30. 
58. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1)(2001). 
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1) (2001). 
60. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000). Two pre-IDEA '97 cases construing this 
section's statutory predecessor were cited by the Tunstall court in support of its 
decision. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 706 (citing Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369 
(8th Cir. 1996); Timms v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 722 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1983)). A careful 
reading of both cases shows that they undermine, rather than buttress, the Tunstall 
court's rationale. To varying degrees, each case stands for the proposition that the 
current section 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) applies to broad age ranges, not the subset involved in 
Tunstall. See Yankton Sch. Dist., 93 F.3d at 1376-77 ("An exception exists where state 
law or practice does not provide for [F APE] for students between the ages of 18 and 
21."); Timms, 722 F.2d at 1313-14 (" ... unless providing [FAPE] to children aged ... 
eighteen to twenty-one would be inconsistent with state law or practice or a court 
order"). 
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he plain language of statute in question,61 if the state provides 
pecial education to some members of an age group, it must 
1rovide special education to all members of that age group. 
Vashington does provide special education to some students 
:ged eighteen to twenty-one, 62 so it must provide special 
ducation to all students aged eighteen to twenty-one. The 
tatute in question in Tunstall does not concern all children 
V"ithin a particular age range. Consequently, section 
412(a)(l)(B)(i) does not provide the authority for this policy 
hoice as made by the State of Washington. 
Even if the plain language of this statute did not refer to 
1road age groups, but rather fractions of age groups, the 
mplementing regulations63 adopted by the U.S. Department of 
Gducation support this interpretation. Congress has 
~mpowered the United States Department of Education to 
ssue regulations to enforce the IDEA,64 and the judiciary 
argely defers to the Department's interpretation and 
mplementation of the statute.65 One of the relevant IDEA 
egulations states: 
If State law or a court order requires the State to 
provide education for children with disabilities in any 
disability category in any of these age groups, the State 
must make FAPE available to all children with 
disabilities of the same age who have that disability.66 
Therefore, ifthe state ofWashington provides FAPE to non-
rrcarcerated children with disabilities in all disability 
ategories in the age groups in question, under this federal 
egulation, it must provide special education to all children 
rith disabilities in the subject age ranges, incarcerated or not. 67 
61. An unambiguous statute is enforced according to its plain meaning. See 
tpra n. 51 and accompanying text. 
62. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.155.020(2002); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 392-172-114 to 
~2-172-148 (2001). 
63. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122; 300.300 (2001). 
64. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1406, 1417(b) (2000). Under the "Chevron" doctrine concerning 
te validity of agency regulations, a regulation, within the province of the agency to 
·omulgate, will only be invalidated if it is contrary to the plain language of an 
1ambiguous statute or is an unreasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. See 
1evron U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For more 
formation on the Chevron case, see Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20, at 463-65. 
65. See generally Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20. 
66. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(l) (2001). 
67. For age ranges and categories of disability, see Wash. Rev. Code § 
:A.155.020 (2002); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 392-172-114 to 392-172-148 (2001). 
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Additionally, the IDEA regulations provide that a state is 
not required to provide FAPE to children with disabilities, aged 
eighteen through twenty-one, if "State law expressly prohibits, 
or does not authorize, the expenditure of public funds to 
provide education to nondisabled children in that age group."68 
Under Washington's Basic Education Act, students under age 
twenty-one are entitled to attend public school,69 and the State 
of Washington makes adult education broadly available 
through community colleges and local school districts70 (often at 
no cost),71 including high school completion courses for students 
who are twenty-one years or older.72 The State of Washington 
makes public funds available to educate persons without 
disabilities in the relevant age group. Thus, there is no "State 
law" prohibiting expenditures of public funds for such a 
purpose. 73 
Finally, the IDEA regulations state that the provision of 
FAPE to children with disabilities between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-one is not required if that "requirement is 
inconsistent with a court order that governs the provision of 
free appropriate public education to children with disabilities 
in that State.'m In Tunstall, there was no particular court 
order75 governing special education that would be inconsistent 
with providing F APE to the inmates with disabilities, in the 
68. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(i) (2001). 
69. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.150.220(3) (2002). 
70. Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.50.030(12) (defining "adult education"); Wash. Rev. 
Code . § 28B.50.250 (allowing local school districts to offer adult education if not in 
conflict with programs offered by local community college); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 180-
72-040 to 180-72-070 (2001) (implementing regulations). 
71. Wash. Admin. Code § 131-28-026(4)(a) (2001) ("no charge" for "adult basic 
education" at community and technical colleges). 
72. Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.50.030(12) (2002); Wash. Admin. Code § 180-72-050 
(2001). 
73. The Tunstall majority excluded inmates, over age eighteen, in adult 
correctional facilities from the scope of the Basic Education Law's guarantee of 
education up to the twenty-first birthday. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 696-98. For purposes of 
34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(i) (2001), however, this is irrelevant. Under that rule, State 
law may eliminate the right to FAPE for children with disabilities in the relevant age 
ranges only if the State does not provide public funds for the education of any student 
without a disability in the age ranges in question. Washington cannot make such a 
claim, and cannot avail itself of§ 300.300(b)(5)(i). 
74. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(ii) (2001). 
75. There is no court order or decree similar to the now-familiar decrees in Pa. 
Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commw., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), or Mills v. 
Bd. o{Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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subject class. Rather, there is only a judicial opinion rejecting 
challenges that a statute is impermissible under the IDEA. If 
"court order" were interpreted in such a manner, it would be an 
invitation to lawlessness. Should that interpretation prevail, 
no IDEA requirement would be secure for children with 
disabilities in the subject age groups. The state could pass a 
statute eliminating any IDEA right for children in the subject 
age group, and a reviewing court could cloak the offensive 
statute in the garb of a "court order." 
There is an additional canon of statutory interpretation and 
construction that undermines the Tunstall court's 
interpretation of the IDEA, as amended. If section 
1412(a)(2)(B)(i) and its implementing regulations had the 
meaning ascribed to them by the Tunstall court, then the 
amendment adding section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii) would have been 
superfluous. Section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i) is identical to language 
from the pre-1997 IDEA.76 If that section provided the 
authority for States to cease providing special education to all 
children with disabilities in adult prisons after their eighteenth 
birthdays, then why did Congress add section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
giving the States a much more limited right to deny FAPE to a 
less expansive group of inmates with disabilities? 
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation and 
construction that each provision of a statute "must, if possible, 
be construed in such a fashion that every word has some 
operative effect."77 Furthermore, Congressional amendments 
are presumed "to have real and substantial effect."78 Hence, 
section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii) must have some practical significance. 
By enacting that section, Congress provided the strongest 
possible evidence that section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i) provided no 
authority to Washington to eliminate the provision of FAPE to 
inmates with disabilities in adult prisons who are eighteen 
years old or older. 
The Tunstall court's decision is further eroded by the 
76. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(2)(B) (1994). 
77. U.S. v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992); accord Mt. St. Tel. & Tel. v. 
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 
(1979). 
78. Stone v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995); accord 
Sutton v. U.S., 819 F.3d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987); Model Statutory Construction Act § 
13(2), 14 U.L.A. 389, 401 (1990) ("In enacting a statute it is presumed that (2) the 
entire statute is intended to be effective."). 
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prominent position adult correctional facilities have m the 
IDEA and in the implementing regulations. First, 
representatives of adult correctional facilities are required 
members on each State's special education advisory board.79 
Second, the IDEA applies to, and the State is responsible for, 
supervising "all educational programs for children with 
disabilities in the State, including all such programs 
administered by any other State or local agency."80 This 
includes adult correctional facilities,81 a point explicitly stated 
in the IDEA regulations.82 
Under the IDEA, as amended in 1997, a state may not deny 
FAPE to all children with disabilities, aged eighteen through 
twenty-one, incarcerated in adult prisons. 83 On this point, the 
Tunstall court erred and the decision should not be followed in 
other jurisdictions. 
2. Pre-1997 IDEA. 
To the extent this inquiry is relevant,84 the pre-1997 IDEA 
does not sanction the State of Washington's statute any more 
than does the post-1997 IDEA First, the IDEA provision 
relied on by the Tunstall court,85 section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i), 
existed in identical form prior to the 1997 Amendments.86 As 
noted above, this statute does not allow for the suspension of 
special education for children with disabilities, as in the 
Tunstall class.87 
The Tunstall court's reliance on the Fourth Circuit's 
decision in Commonwealth v. Rilel8 is also misplaced. The 
Riley court held that students with disabilities "expelled or 
suspended long-term due to serious misconduct wholly 
unrelated to their disabilities [are not entitled to] continued 
79. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(21)(B)(x) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.651(a)(10) (2001). 
80. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(A)(ii) (2000). 
81. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(C) (2000). 
82. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1)(iv) (2001). 
83. See supra n. 53-82 and accompanying text. 
84. The IDEA amendments were effective before the Washington statute was 
effective. Compare Pub. L. 105-17, § 201(a)(l) (relevant portions of IDEA-'97 effective 
on June 4, 1997) with Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.193.900 (effective date Mar. 30, 1998). 
85. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 706. 
86. ld. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1994)). 
87. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text. 
88. 106 F.3d 559. 
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provision of educational services."89 The Riley court reasoned 
that Congress had not expressly conditioned receipt of IDEA 
funds on the provision ofFAPE to children expelled for conduct 
not related to their disabilities. 90 
This rationale does not support the Tunstall decision for 
two fundamental reasons. First, the Riley decision focuses on 
cessation of educational services to children expelled from 
school for conduct not related to their disabilities.91 The 
Washington statute at issue makes no such distinction. 
Instead, it ends all special education services to all 
incarcerated children with disabilities at age eighteen, whether 
or not the particular child was incarcerated for conduct related 
to her disability. 92 Plainly stated, the Tunstall court relies on 
authority that does not support the proposition for which it is 
cited. 
Second, whereas the Riley court found that the IDEA did 
not require continuation of FAPE for children expelled for 
conduct not related to a disability, the pre-1997 IDEA clearly 
required provision of special education to all children with 
disabilities through their twenty-second birthday, whether or 
not incarcerated,93 and any then-existing exception to this 
obligation does not permit States to end special education 
services to the Tunstall class members with disabilities. 94 The 
Tunstall decision, for these two reasons, is distinguishable 
from Riley. 
In addition, assuming that the Riley decision provides 
support for the statute at issue, subsequent congressional 
action calls into question the correctness of the Riley decision. 
Specifically, in 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to state that 
even children with disabilities who are expelled for conduct not 
89. I d. at 561. For more discussion of the aftermath of the Riley decision and the 
1997 IDEA amendments, see Theresa J. Bryant, The Death Knell for School Expulsion: 
The 1997 IDEA Amendments to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 47 
Am. U. L. Rev. 487 (1998). 
90. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561. 
91. Id. 
92. For discussions of the often confusing relationship between special education 
law and criminal law, see e.g. Warboys, supra n. 7; Leone, supra n. 7; Mayes & Zirkel, 
supra n. 7; Robinson & Rapport, supra n. 7. 
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1994); see also Letter to Teagarden, 29 IDELR 973, 
974 (OSEP 1997) (citing Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 800-801 (D.S.C. 1995); 
Donnell C. v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Green v. 
Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 976 (D. Mass. 1981)). 
94. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text. 
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related to their disabilities are entitled to FAPE.95 Although 
ordinarily a congressional amendment is presumed to indicate 
a change in the law,96 that is not always the case. For example, 
a division of authorities addressing a question resolved by the 
amendment may indicate that the "subsequent amendment is 
intended to clarify, rather than change, the existing law."97 
Regarding cessation of special education to children with 
disabilities expelled for conduct not related to their disability, 
the Riley decision is contrary to prior decisions from the Sixth 
Circuie8 and Fifth Circuit. 99 The Seventh Circuit100 and 
arguably the Ninth Circuie01 are both in accord with Riley. 
Stepping in to resolve this circuit split, Congress stated that its 
amendment requiring continuation of services to expelled 
students was a "clarification[] of current law."102 In light of 
these clear statements of an intention to codify existing law, 
rather than create new law, the potency of the Riley precedent 
is significantly diluted. 
B. The Statute at Issue in Tunstall Represents Bad Policy 
Not only is the Supreme Court of Washington's decision in 
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1) (2000), 1415(k)(5)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.121(d) 
(2001), 300.524(a) (2001). For more information on the IDEA's provisions concerning 
the discipline of children with disabilities, see e.g. Cynthia A. Dieterich & Christine J. 
Villani, Functional Behavior Assessment: Process without Procedure, 2000 B.Y.U. Educ. 
& L.J. 209; Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the 
Disabled Student, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Allen G. Osborne, Discipline of Special-
Education Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 29 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 513 (2001); Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC: 
Disciplining Children with Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 77 (2000); Carl R. Smith, Behavioral and Discipline Provision of the IDEA '97: 
Implicit Competencies Yet to Be Confirmed, 66 Exceptional Children 403 (2000); Perry 
A. Zirkel, The IDEA's Suspension/Expulsion Requirements: A Practical Picture, 134 
Educ. L. Rep. 19 (West 1999). 
96. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text. 
97. In re Fielder, 799 F.2d 656, 660-661 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Adams, 761 
F.2d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing cases)). Although such arguments are not 
favored, see C. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1994) ("they should 
not be rejected out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for 
legislative intent."); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n. 8 (1980). 
98. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1982). 
99. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), disapproved on other 
grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). 
100. Doe v. Bd. ofEduc., 115 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1997). 
101. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986), affd on other grounds sub. 
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 316 (1988). 
102. H.R. Rep. 105-95, 90 (1997); Sen. Rep. 105-17, 11 (1997). 
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Tunstall not legally supportable, 103 it is also bad public policy. 
This discussion of public policy is necessary because other 
States may be emboldened to adopt similar legislation by the 
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 
Tunstall. 104 This is particularly important because several 
states, in addition to Washington and California, have been 
historically reluctant to offer special education in adult 
correctional facilities. 105 
Due to the inordinately high number of persons with 
disabilities in the criminal justice system, 106 close attention 
must be paid to any policy choice concerning the conditions of 
confinement of children and young adults in America. 107 
Common goals, often concurrent and contradictory, of juvenile 
and adult corrections systems include rehabilitation and 
prevention, punishment and retribution, and deterrence.108 
Many responses to crime and delinquency may not be effective; 
in fact, some, such as "Scared Straight" shock-tactic programs, 
may "do more harm than good."109 Given the fact that a poor 
education places a person at a high risk of incarceration110 and 
that incarcerating an individual is very costly, 111 states and 
local governments, if acting rationally, should pursue policies 
that will reduce the likelihood that inmates will re-offend upon 
103. See supra Part III. C. stating that Tunstall is "bad law". 
104. 532 u.s. 920 (2001). 
105. Rita Kirshstein & Clayton Best, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Survey of State 
Correctional Educational Systems: Analysis of Data from 1992 Field Test 3 (1996) (only 
33 of 42 responding states offer special education in adult prisons). 
106. See Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 968 (D. Mass. 1981); Warboys, supra 
n. 7, at 30-37; Conward, supra n. 11, at 2448-50; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 761-65; Leone, 
supra n. 7; Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 126; Robinson & Rapport, supra n. 7, at 19-
21; Soliz & Cuttler, supra n. 7, at 267; Better Services Could Reduce Need For Juvenile 
Justice, Sch. Violence Alert (Mar. 6, 2001). According to limited data, at least one 
percent of adult inmates with disabilities receive special education services. Kirshstein 
& Best, supra n. 105, at 5. Kirschstein and Best's data is limited by a low response 
rate to this particular question on their survey instrument (19 of 50 states) and by the 
fact that their data does not distinguish between inmates who are eligible, age-wise, for 
IDEA and inmates who have aged out ofiDEA eligibility. 
107. See Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83. 
108. Id. at 78; see also Pattison, supra n. 28; Ira M. Schwartz, Delinquency 
Prevention: Where's the Beef?, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 132 (1991). 
109. Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83; Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 156-57. 
110. See e.g. Conward, supra n. 11, at 2447; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 760; Stanley A. 
Karcz et al., Abrupt Transitions for Youths Leaving School: Models of Interagency 
Cooperation, 1 Techniques 497, 497 (1985); Webber, supra n. 11, at 97. 
111. See e.g., Kelly, supra n. 7, at 758 ($37,000 per year to incarcerate an 
individual in the California Youth Authority). 
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release. The literature makes clear that education, including 
special education, is a key part of an overall strategy to reduce 
criminal behavior by children and young adults.112 Ignoring the 
educational needs of all incarcerated children,113 especially 
those with disabilities, is "morally and fiscally untenable."114 
There is every indication that providing education to 
incarcerated individuals with disabilities will reduce the 
likelihood that they will again become involved in the criminal 
justice system.115 Any short-term savings justifying the statute 
at issue in Tunstall 116 will likely be overwhelmed by the 
benefits foregone by not providing FAPE to children with 
disabilities over eighteen who are confined to adult prisons.117 
The enactment of Washington Revised Code chapter 28A.193 in 
1998 is thus a departure from sound public policy. The State of 
Washington would be well-advised to reconsider this statute, 
and her sister states are advised not to follow her lead. 
112. See e.g. Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 156 (citing studies); see also Warboys, 
supra n. 7, at 64-66; Conward, supra n. 11, at 1258-59; Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83; 
Karcz, supra n. 110, at 497-99; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 770-73; Howard N. Snyder, The 
Juvenile Court and Deliquency Cases, Future of Children 53, 61 (Winter 1996); 
Schwartz, supra n. 111, at 138; Better Services . .. , supra n. 106. 
113. The educational needs of minority students with disabilities in the adult 
criminal justice system are an additional area of concern to policy makers and 
practitioners. Given the overrepresentation of persons of color in the criminal justice 
system (see Pattison, supra n. 38; see also Conward, supra n. 11, at 2453-55; Snyder, 
supra n. 112, at 59-60) and in special education (see e.g. Theresa Glennon, Race, 
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wise. L. Rev. 1237; Robert 
Pressman, A Comprehensive Approach to the Disparate Special Education Placement 
Rates of African-American and National-Origin Minority Youth, 27 Clearinghouse Rev. 
323 (1993); Dalun Zhang & Antonis Katsiyannis, Minority Representation in Special 
Education: A Persistent Challenge, 23 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 180 (2002)), any 
approach to end special education in adult correctional facilities must be considered 
carefully from a racial justice standpoint. 
114. Kelly, supra n. 7, at 757. 
115. See e.g. Karcz, supra n. 110, at 497. 
116. In Washington, it costs approximately $10,000 per student per year to provide 
special education in adult prisons. Washington State Must ... , supra n. 16. 
117. The cost differential between more punitive policies and more 
therapeutidrehabilitative policies are often stunning. Professor Conward notes that 
one million dollars spent on early intervention would "prevent as many as 250 crimes." 
Conward, supra n. 11, at 2455 (citing Sandy Wilber, Can Prevention Programs Stem 
the Tide of Delinquency?: Are We Penny-Wise and Pound Foolish?, Juv. Just. 
<http://www.juvenilejustice.com>). A similar amount of money spent on incarceration 
would only prevent 60 crimes. Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The State of Washington, in passing a statute ending 
special education for many persons with disabilities in adult 
prisons, made a poor policy choice. In Tunstall v. Bergeson, the 
Supreme Court of Washington erroneously rejected challenges 
to that statute based on the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. Notwithstanding the denial of certiorari in 
Tunstall by the Supreme Court of the United States, other 
states should steer clear of the course plotted by the State of 
Washington. 
